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Abstract—Smart jammer nodes can disrupt communication
between a transmitter and a receiver in a wireless network,
and they leave traces that are undetectable to classical jammer
identification techniques, hidden in the time-frequency plane.
These traces cannot be effectively identified through the use of the
classical Fourier transform based time-frequency transformation
(TFT) techniques with a fixed resolution. Inspired by the adaptive
resolution property provided by the wavelet transforms, in this
paper, we propose a jammer identification methodology that
includes a pre-processing step to obtain a multi-resolution image,
followed by the use of a classifier. Support vector machine (SVM)
and deep convolutional neural network (DCNN) architectures are
investigated as classifiers to automatically extract the features of
the transformed signals and to classify them. Three different jam-
ming attacks are considered, the barrage jamming that targets
the complete transmission bandwidth, the synchronization signal
jamming attack that targets synchronization signals and the
reference signal jamming attack that targets the reference signals
in an LTE downlink transmission scenario. The performance of
the proposed approach is compared with the classical Fourier
transform based TFT techniques, demonstrating the efficacy of
the proposed approach in the presence of smart jammers.
Index Terms—Smart jamming attacks, jammer identification,
LTE, wavelet transformation, support vector machine, deep
convolution neural network.
I. INTRODUCTION
ORTHOGONAL frequency division multiple access(OFDMA) technique constitutes the physical layer mul-
tiplexing method of choice for the Long Term Evolution
(LTE) networks and its later Releases due to its robustness
against noise and fading impacts [1]. Based on the advantages
provided by OFDMA, LTE has brought up numerous favorable
properties including but not limited to higher data rates,
better coverage, higher energy efficiency and lower latency
than previous cellular networking technologies [2]. Despite
the advantages that come with the OFDMA technique, LTE
networks suffer from attacks generated by active radio nodes
[3]. These attacks generally include cases where an attacker
(a jamming node) transmits a signal aiming to falsify the
receiver or disrupt the communication. Such communication
disruptions are frequently referred to as layer-1 denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks.
Jamming attacks have been one of the conspicuous issues in
wireless communication networks. As communication systems
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become an integral part of our daily lives, transmission of the
critical information is expected to be more reliable, increasing
the effective impact of the jamming attacks. These attacks
can be initiated in various ways through different types of
jamming nodes. In order to avoid or to mitigate the effects
of the jamming, it is critical to detect the existence of a
jamming node and to detect its attack methodology. These
processes are respectively named as jammer detection and
jammer identification.
As detailed in the following section, jammer identification
is usually based on the network measurements or signal char-
acteristics. On determining the attack type, identification al-
gorithms may use different probabilistic approaches. Machine
learning techniques also gain importance on identification and
detection algorithms. Especially, deep convolutional neural
network (DCNNs) have been studied in different communica-
tion problems that require quick response in real-time applica-
tions. The main application areas can be listed as localization
[4], modulation classification [5], channel decoding [6] and
waveform recognition [7].
A common step in all of these detection and classification
methods is a time-frequency transformation (TFT) based pre-
processing which is capable of capturing the jamming effects
on the received signal. Most commonly used TFT method is
spectrogram and has been utilized for different signal analysis
purposes [8]. Spectrogram is based on short time Fourier
transform (STFT) and represents the signal on the time-
frequency plane. As it will be detailed below, spectrogram
uses fixed window size which results in fixed resolution of
the signal on time-frequency plane.
Concurrent with the evolution of communication networks,
newly introduced jammer types may attack in very short time
intervals or narrow and changing frequency bands. In that
way, jamming nodes are able to hide in the time-frequency
plane and become invisible to conventional TFT methods
such as STFT. These kind of attackers are named as smart
jammers, and their effects are already shown in numerical and
measurement studies [9], [10]. Reduced hardware costs with
easily accessible software enable smart jammers to observe the
transmissions and detect the vulnerable parts of the transmitted
packets, possibly targeting the reference signals. With these
observations, smart jammers gain an advantage over the legit-
imate nodes as shown in [11]. Defense mechanisms against
jamming attacks are proposed from different perspectives
such as repeated game algorithms [11], or frequency hopping
algorithms [12]. These network strategy algorithms require the
knowledge of the jammer type in order to combat against
the jammer attack. Therefore, the jammer identification is
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Figure 1: An exemplary graphical representation of (a) short
time Fourier transform (STFT) and (b) wavelet transform.
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Figure 2: A base station (eNB), monitoring node (MN) and a
jammer in a LTE cell. The received signal from the MN would
be the superposition of LTE signal and jammer signal.
a requirement prior to the jamming prevention/anti-jamming
systems.
Motivated by this problem, we propose a wavelet tranfor-
mation based pre-processing for smart jammer identification
in order to improve detection and classification performance.
Wavelet transforms are commonly used signal processing
techniques thanks to the tunable time and frequency reso-
lution properties [13]. Similar to Fourier transform, wavelet
transforms represent a signal through a linear combination
on particular basis functions. In Fourier transform, the basis
functions are sinusoidals which are not localized on time-
frequency plane due to continuous oscillation. On the contrary,
wavelets are finite in time and localized on time-frequency
plane, enabling successful detection and identification of the
smart jammers hiding in the time-frequency plane.
STFT provides an observation on temporal changes of the
signal by applying a rectangular window to the signal before
Fourier transform. Since same rectangular window is applied
to the signal in STFT, time-frequency resolution of the signal
would be same at all positions. Unlike STFT, varying window
size in the wavelet transforms provides multi-resolution on the
different positions of the signal [14], as highlighted in Figure
1. In this way, we can provide an adaptive resolution property
against changing signal characteristics resulting from smart
jammers. We consider the LTE-downlink channel jamming
scenario, where a stationary monitoring node (MN) captures
downlink channel observations by continuously processing the
received baseband signal. The MN is synchronized with the
cell and a stationary jammer attacks the transmission from
the base station (eNB), as shown in Figure 2. Note that, MN
does not have any prior knowledge about the jammer attack.
In the presence of a smart jammer, two major vulnerabilities
become apparent in LTE-downlink transmission: synchroniza-
tion signals and reference signals [36]. These signals are
transmitted along with the message signal over the network.
Unlike message signals, they contain critical information and
even a partial disruption of this information may cause loss
of the complete LTE packet. Our main contributions can be
listed as the following;
• We introduce a novel system model for the identification
of the smart jammers. Proposed identification system
can be divided into two steps: (i) a pre-processing step
to highlight the disrupted parts of the signal, (ii) a
classification step that automatically identifies jamming
signals.
• We provide a wavelet based pre-processing step that con-
veys multi-resolution representation of the signals. The
validity of the proposed pre-processing step is confirmed
via simulations. We compare Gabor wavelet transform
with TFT’s that were previously used for classification
pre-processing: spectrogram and Choi-Williams.
• For the classification step, we propose a DCNN ar-
chitecture to automatically extract the features of the
transformed signals and to classify them.
• As an alternative for the classification step, we utilized
SVM also for the first time considering the smart jam-
mer identification. The classification accuracies of two
classification schemes are compared with each other.
• The proposed identification scheme is repeated for dif-
ferent location cases considering that the identification
accuracy could change with respect to distances between
the jammer and the MN or between the eNB and the MN.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we discuss jammer detection, classification and mitigation
literature. In Section III-A, we briefly review some relevant
features of LTE downlink signal model. In Section III-B,
we discuss possible jammer attack types. In Section IV, we
present the proposed system model for jammer identification.
Numerical analysis and simulations are presented in Section
V, and the open issues are given in Section VI. Finally, the
paper is concluded in VII.
II. RELATED WORK
As presented in Table I, anti-jamming literature can be
reviewed into several different research focuses. In [15],
the authors consider reactive jamming attacks on the packet
based transmission network. They present an anti-jamming
strategy based on zero-sum game model at the media access
control (MAC) layer. The authors of [16] present a smart
jamming detection algorithm based on the time-series analysis.
In [17], the authors propose a cross-layer jammer detection
and prevention system that utilizes game theoretical model.
[18] presents a real time smart jamming detection system
by utilizing Kalman filters. [19] shows that by using SVM
classifier the performance of jamming detection improves and
hardware complexity decreases. The authors of [20] consider
pilot jamming and spoofing attacks, and they propose a random
matrix theory-based source enumeration approach for attack
detection.
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Table I: Literature review of the anti-jamming techniques.
Research target Reference Attack Type Method
jamming detection
[15] MAC layer smart jammer attacks Game theory
[16] MAC layer smart jammer attacks Time series analysis
[17] smart jammer attacks Game theory
[18] hybrid jammer attacks in smart grid Kalman filters
[19] continuous single-tone attack SVM
[20] pilot spoofing on MISO system random matrix theory, beamforming
jamming identification
[11] MAC layer attacks Game theory
[21] jamming in vehicle communication unsupervised learning with clustering
[22] MAC layer attacks PSR & PDR
[23] BJ attacks on SAR CNN
[24] MAC layer attacks Machine learning
[25] MAC layer attacks CNN
[26] attacks on time varying channel jamming coherence bandwidth
our solution smart jammer attacks at LTE physical layer TFT pre-processing with DCNN classifier
jammer countermeasure
[27] LTE PSS&SSS attack Adaptive filtering
[28] OFDM smart jamming pilot randomization
[29] pilot distortion attack in massive MIMO system Detection multiple-antenna CFO estimate
[30] jamming frequency hopping
[31] NOMA jamming Game theory, reinforcement learning
[32] SJ attacks on wireless energy harvesting Markov decision process
[33] Cyber-Physical System Stackelberg Game
[34] smart jamming on VANETs Game theory, reinforcement learning
[35] generative adversarial network and mitigation deep learning
Besides jammer detection, identification of a specific attack
type is also a critical part of the anti-jamming strategies.
In [11], the authors propose a jammer identification system
that differentiates the bandwidth characteristics of different
jamming types. In [21], the authors propose unsupervised
learning algorithms that identify different type of jamming
attacks on vehicle communication systems. [24] presents a
machine learning-based jamming identification approach for
IEEE 802.11 networks, where the authors compare the ac-
curacy and robustness of different popular machine learning
techniques, which include decision tree, adaptive boosting,
support vector machine (SVM), expectation maximization and
random forest. Jammer identification is usually based on
network measurements such as packet delivery ratio [37],
signal strength [22], packet transmission ratio and erroneous
packet ratio [38].
In addition to shallow machine learning based identification
schemes, the use of DCNNs have been studied in different
communication problems that require quick response in real-
time applications [39]. In [23], the proposed system model can
identify different types of barrage jamming attacks using CNN
as a classifier. The most related paper with our work, [40]
proposes a CNN based jammer identification method where
jammer types have been classified solely depending on the
attacked bandwidth. In our work, we consider smart jammer
attacks at the physical layer of an LTE network. The proposed
system model can identify 3 different jamming types as well
as inactive jammer case.
Jammer countermeasure is another significant part of the
anti-jamming strategies. While some countermeasures do not
require the knowledge of the attacker type, some countermea-
sures require the knowledge of the attacked bandwidth or the
attacker strategy. In this case, these systems require a jammer
identification process before performing their strategies. In
[28], the authors propose an adaptive filtering method consid-
ering the reference signal attacks to the LTE networks. Their
methodology does not require an identification process. Simi-
larly, in [30], the authors utilize the multiple antenna diversity
to combat the jamming attacks without any identification
process. However, in [31], the legitimate nodes benefit from
the knowledge of the jammer type and existence. In [32, 34],
the jammer identification gives an advantage to the legitimate
nodes for combating the jamming attacks. The authors of
[35] initiate a jamming attack using a deep neural network
and propose mitigation methods for this type of attack. As
a main difference from other machine learning based anti-
jamming systems, we investigate the effect of the different
pre-processing methods on the learning performance of the
machine learning methods.
III. BACKGROUND
This section is devoted to the review of relevant char-
acteristics of LTE downlink channel model and jamming
attack models. As previously mentioned, smart jammers would
require some insights about the physical layer to focus on
the vulnerabilities of the system. Therefore, before describing
jamming attack models, the physical layer properties of an
LTE system should be addressed.
A. LTE - PHY Model
LTE downlink channel uses OFDMA as the channel access
scheme. The transmission can be in frequency division duplex
(FDD) or time division duplex (TDD) mode [41]. Figure 3
shows an illustration of an LTE frame considering FDD trans-
mission mode. Data is delivered in frames of 10 milliseconds.
An LTE frame is composed of ten subframes of 1 ms, and
each subframe contains 2 time slots of 0.5 ms. Each time slot
contains L symbols, and L depends on the cyclic-prefix (CP)
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Figure 3: LTE frame, subframes and time slots.
mode. K denotes the total number of subcarriers. Depending
on the transmission bandwidth, K changes between 128 to
2048. The smallest defined unit, ak,l, denotes a resource
element which consists of kth subcarrier during the lth symbol,
where k = 0, 1, · · · ,K−1 and l = 0, 1, · · · , L−1. According
to the selected bandwidth and protocol, control and message
signals are mapped into empty resource blocks.
From an attacker perspective, obtaining the exact subcarrier
and symbol index of the control signals can be beneficial
because attacker can damage the transmission by attacking
only the resource elements where control signals are mapped.
The remaining part of this section will focus on the generation
and mapping of the control signals in LTE downlink channel.
1) Synchronization Signals: In order to determine and to
synchronize to a cell, a user equipment (UE) needs to acquire
the frame timing information, estimate the carrier frequency
offset (CFO) and also identify the cell. For this purposes,
eNB generates and maps two signals into resource elements:
primary synchronization signal (PSS) and secondary synchro-
nization signal (SSS).
eNB maps the PSS in the last symbol of first time slot of
the first subframe (subframe 0). The PSS is also mapped in
subframe 5 which means UE can be synchronized on 5 ms
basis. SSS symbols are also mapped in the same subframe of
PSS with the same subcarrier indexes but a symbol before the
PSS.
To generate the PSS and the SSS, the transmitter uses a
complex valued Zadoff Chu (ZC) sequence [41]. Let du(m)
denote the ZC sequence of the PSS and the SSS,
du(m) =
e
−jpium(m+1)
63 , 0 ≤ m ≤ 30
e
−jpiu(m+1)(m+2)
63 , 31 ≤ m ≤ 61 , (1)
where u is the root value for the ZC series and changes
with the index of the symbol. In this case du(m) is mapped
according to the relevant resource elements;
aks,ls = du(m),
where m = 0, 1, . . . , 61 and u ∈ {0, 10}. ks denotes the
subcarrier indices of mapped resource elements with ks =
m− 31 +K/2. ls denotes the symbol indexes of the mapped
resource elements and set to L− 2 for the PSS and L− 1 for
the SSS.
At the UE, first PSS is extracted for time frame and
frequency synchronization. In the next step UE extracts the
SSS. Through the SSS, the UE extracts about the CP mode and
the duplexing mode used by the cell. From their combination,
the mapped locations of the reference signals can be found
in order to realize the channel estimation and equalization
steps. In case of any disruption on the PSS and SSS, not only
the synchronization at the UE is affected, but also the packet
will get corrupted because of the erroneous channel estimation
[27].
2) Reference Signals: Reference signals are periodically
transmitted in LTE networks to perform channel estimation
and frequency domain equalization at the receiver side after CP
removal and demodulation steps. The cell identification deter-
mines time and frequency domain locations of the quadrature
phase shift keying (QPSK) modulated reference signals. In this
work, subcarrier and symbol indices of the reference signals
are assumed as fixed, respectively as krf = 0, 7, 14, · · · , N
and lrf = 0, 7, 14, · · · , N . Each akrf ,lrf is filled with a
random complex number, akrf ,lrf ∈ { 1+j√2 ,
1−j√
2
, −1+j√
2
, −1−j√
2
}.
UE is assumed to know the index values krf , lrf as well as the
values of the reference signals. The receiver produces an initial
estimate for the channel coefficients of the received signal
by utilizing the reference signals. Afterwards, these initial
estimates are interpolated by using the additional information
coming from the other resource elements, and the channel
coefficient estimates are finalized. Following the channel
estimation, UE recovers the received packet by using the
estimated channel coefficients for equalization. If the estimated
coefficients are erroneous, then coefficients belonging to other
resource elements will also be inaccurate after interpolation.
Additional control signals may also get mapped into resource
blocks [41]. Yet, in our model, resource elements are filled by
the union of the resource elements filled with synchronization
signals, reference signals and message signals. The mapped
subcarrier and symbol indexes for message signal can be
denoted with km and lm, respectively.
After mapping all signals into resource blocks, discrete
time baseband representation of the transmitted downlink LTE
signal s(l) can be obtained as
s(l) =
1√
K
K−1∑
k=0
ak,le
j2pikl/Kω
(
l/K +KCP − 1
)
, (2)
where KCP denotes the cyclic-prefix length and ω(l′) is a
discrete rectangular window that is defined by
ω(l′) =
{
1 ; 0 ≤ l′ ≤ 1
0 ; otherwise
. (3)
B. Jamming Attacks
Jamming attacks can be classified according to different
characteristics such as attacked bandwidth and jamming signal
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transmission. We will focus on jammers that attack the LTE
characteristics explained above. Therefore four different types
of jamming cases are considered: (i) there is no attack to the
system, (ii) the complete frequency band is attacked, (iii)
only the synchronization signals are attacked and (iv) only
reference signals are attacked. Following titles are the specific
names for these different jammer types respectively.
1) Barrage Jamming (BJ): Barrage jamming (BJ) is the
most frequent form of the jamming attack. Its detection [42],
[43] and mitigation [44] have been exhaustively discussed in
the literature. In BJ, the attacker continuously transmits band
limited noise over the entire spectrum of the receiver. Note
that with enough observations over the network, attacker may
transmit noise only during the transmission of a specific signal
[45]. This approach requires more complexity or additional in-
formation with respect to the network, but it reduces the energy
consumption of the jammer [46]. With additional knowledge
on the network, BJ attacks can further be diversified, but in this
work BJ is assumed to transmit noise over the entire bandwidth
of the receiver. Discrete time representation of the transmitted
BJ signal is
jb(l) ∼ CN (0, σ2j ),
where CN (µ, σ2) denotes the complex normal distribution
with mean µ and variance σ2. Even though BJ does not require
any prior knowledge of the network, in order to initiate the
following attacks, an attacker will require to extract some
information about the LTE network.
2) Synchronization Signal Jamming (SSJ): Unlike BJ, in
synchronization signal jamming (SSJ), the attacker should be
aware of the locations of the resource blocks as explained
above. Although there are several ways of jamming synchro-
nization signals, we assume that the attacker generates an LTE
frame similar to the transmitter, but maps only PSS and the
SSS signals to related resource elements. The rest of the packet
is filled with zeros. The process can be shown as
ajsks,ls ∼ CN (0, σ2s),
where ks and ls are also given above. Remaining resource
blocks of the jammer are filled with zeros: ajskrf ,lrf = 0 and
ajskm,lm = 0. In this case, discrete time representation of the
transmitted SSJ signal can be denoted as
js(l) =
1√
K
K−1∑
k=0
ajsk,le
j2pikl/Kω
(
l/K +KCP − 1
)
. (4)
Note that, the SSJ signal transmission should be synchronized
with the eNodeB, and the indices, ks and ls, should also be
known by the attacker.
3) Reference Signal Jamming (RSJ): In reference signal
jamming (RSJ), the attacker is assumed to know the locations
of the reference signals. For RSJ signal generation, we have
followed an approach similar to SSJ signal generation. We
assumed that the attacker generates the random signal only
on the reference signals locations and maps zeros on the data
locations similar to the SC. The mapping can be shown as
a
jrf
krf ,lrf
∼ CN (0, σ2r),
where krf and lrf are also given above. The remaining
resource elements are filled with zeros; ajrfks,ls = 0 and
a
jrf
km,lm
= 0. In this case, discrete time representation of the
RSJ signal is
jrf (l) =
1√
K
K−1∑
k=0
a
jrf
k,l e
j2pikl/Kω
(
l/K +KCP − 1
)
. (5)
4) Received Signal Model: In an ideal case, received signal
is affected by the channel attenuation and the noise. Consid-
ering a flat fading discrete time uncorrelated channel in the
existence of a jammer, we can obtain the received baseband
signal as
r(l) =
s(l) · h(l)√
dPL1
+
ji(l) · g(l)√
dPL2
+ η(l), (6)
where ji(l) is the jamming signal of the jammer type i, while
i ∈ {b, s, rf} respectively for BJ, SSJ and RSJ. r(l) is the re-
ceived signal, h(l) is the channel coefficient for the transmitted
signal, g(l) is the channel coefficient for the jammer signal, d1
is the distance between the eNB and the MN, d2 is the distance
between the jammer and the MN, PL is the path loss exponent
and η(l) is the noise at the receiver. The channel coefficients
are assumed to be complex valued random variables with
h(l), g(l) ∼ CN (0, σ2) distribution, and the noise at the
receiver is assumed as η(l) ∼ CN (0, σ2n). Resulting signal-to-
noise (SNR) ratio expression can be obtained as the following
SNR =
Psσ
2
σ2nd
PL
1
, (7)
where Ps denotes the power of the transmitted signal. Another
important parameter for jammer analysis is the signal-to-
jamming ratio (SJR) and given as the following
SJR =
Ps
Pji
(
d2
d1
)PL
, (8)
where Pji is the jamming power. In the following section,
jammer signal identification model will be presented. We
aim to identify the jammer type, i, by applying different
transformation and classification methods to the r(l).
IV. IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM MODEL
The general system structure and alternative operations for
the system model are presented in this section. Identification
system model is shown in Figure 2. The pre-processing part
of the identification system is carried out via a TFT which
represents a 1D time signal into 2D time-frequency plane.
After transformation, 2D output signal can be named as time-
frequency representation (TFR). Before classification, the TFR
of the received signal is saved as an image. The second part of
the identification system includes the automatic classification
for the generated images.
A. Pre-processing with Time-Frequency Transformations
Time-frequency transformations (TFT) allow analyzing the
temporal changes of the signal, and they give a compact
representation on the time-frequency domain. In his famous
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overview paper [47], Cohen explains this advantage with an
example on sunlight analysis. If the collected data is Fourier
transformed, the power density spectrum does not show that
the spectral composition of the signal is very different in sunset
or sunrise in comparison with other time periods. Therefore,
one can suggest that we can capture measurements in prede-
fined time intervals and Fourier transform these samples. By
extending or narrowing the time period we can find temporary
changes in our data. This example forms the fundamental
idea behind the STFT or its magnitude square representation
spectrogram, and it also indicates the trade-off between time
and frequency resolution. Other Fourier based TFT’s can
be considered improvements on the spectrogram to provide
effective solutions to tackle this trade-off.
1) Short Time Fourier Transformation (STFT): In spectro-
gram, first a windowing function ω(l) is applied to the received
signal to divide it into short time periods. Then fast Fourier
transform (FFT) is applied separately to each time period. We
can show the STFT of the r(l) as
Rs(c, κ) =
1√
2pi
(L−1)/2∑
l=(−L+1)/2
r(l)ω(c− l)e−j2picl/L, (9)
where c = t × fs indicates the sample number, and κ is
the frequency variable. For our case, frequency values of the
related subcarriers as κ = k∆f where ∆f shows the frequency
difference of the consecutive subcarriers. ω(l′) is a discrete
time rectangular function with length l˜ having a unit magnitude
for (−l˜ + 1)/2 ≤ l′ ≤ (l˜ − 1)/2 . Note that ω(l′) can also
be generated as a Hamming or Hanning function, but we only
consider the rectangular form because of its simplicity. Then
the spectrogram of the signal is
Ps(c, κ) = |Rs(c, κ)|2. (10)
Time resolution of the spectrogram is δtS = (l˜−1)/(2fs) [48].
Using this approach, we can obtain the frequency content of
the signal for short time periods.
2) Choi-Williams Transformation (CWT): First proposed
in [49], Choi-Williams Transform (CWT) actually aims to
overcome difficulties on another TFT named as Wigner-Ville
transformation (WVT). In WVT, multitone signals generate
high power cross terms that should be zero. CWT remark-
ably reduces the cross-terms without worsening the spectral
representation. The CWT of the received signal is
Rcw(c, κ) = 2
2L−1∑
l=0
S′(c, l)e−j2piκl/L, (11)
where S′(c, l) is
S′(c, l) =

S(c, l) , 0 ≤ l ≤ L− 1
0 , l = L
S(c, l − 2L) , L+ 1 ≤ l ≤ 2L− 1
(12)
and
S(c, l) = ω(ν)
L/2∑
ν=−L/2
1√
4pil2/σ
e
− (ν−1)2
4pi2/σ r(l + ν)r∗(l − ν),
(13)
Similar to spectrogram, we can define the absolute square of
the transform:
Pcw(c, κ) = |Rcw(c, κ)|2. (14)
The effective time resolution is δtcw = (l˜ − 1)/(2fs) [48].
Finally the resulting TFR Pcw(c, κ) is color-mapped and saved
for the further classification process.
3) Gabor Wavelet Transformation: In the presence of a
smart jammer, the received signal r(l) would show varying
characteristics over time. While the attacked parts exhibit
abrupt changes in the signal, non-attacked parts would have
smooth changing components. These abrupt changes become
apparent in higher frequency components. Increasing the scal-
ing factor of the wavelet provides a better representation of the
abrupt changes on the signal. We can construct a TFR from
the received signal by sequencing the arrays obtained from
different scale factors of wavelet transformations.
Among various wavelet bases, Gabor functions provide the
optimal resolution in both time and frequency domains by
using a Gaussian shaped windowing function [47]. Gabor
wavelet transformation function can be expressed as
Ψ(c, f) =
f
γ
√
pi
e
f2
γ2
c2
ej2picf , (15)
where f/γ is the scaling factor and γ is the quality factor
and f = 1, 2, · · · , F . The transformation is carried out via
convolving the received signal r(l) with defined Gabor wavelet
transformation function:
Rgm(c, f) = r(l) ∗Ψ(c, f), (16)
where ∗ denotes the convolution operation and f shows the
different frequency values on which wavelet transform is
applied. The TFR, also named as scalogram for Gabor-wavelet
transform is
Pgm(c, f) = |Rgm(c, f)|2, (17)
where the time resolution of the scalogram is defined as
δtgm(f) = γ/f [48]. Ps, Pcw and Pgm are TFR’s of the
received signal and they are constructed as 2D matrices. They
are stored in the memory for training the classification meth-
ods. The values in these magnitude level representations are
color-mapped by their amplitude values. The color-mapping
operation can be seen as a quantization of the magnitude levels
into different color levels.
B. Classification Methods
In this work, we consider SVM and DCNN for classification
purposes due to their high performances as reported in the
literature [19], [40].
1) Support Vector Machine (SVM): Support vector machine
(SVM) is a supervised learning method and was firstly devel-
oped for binary classification. The main idea behind SVM is
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Figure 4: A detailed DCNN block diagram. F@Υ1×Υ2 where F represents the number of feature maps in the corresponding
layer, whereas Υ1 ×Υ2 denotes the size of anindividual feature map.
finding the optimal decision boundary by discriminating the
feature vectors. The decision boundary is also named as a
hyperplane and for optimality it has to maximize the separation
between two data classes. The method starts with selecting a
hyperplane in the feature space and is defined as follows;
wT x + b = 0, (18)
where x is the feature vector or in this study output of PCA, w
is the support vector, (·)T denotes transpose operation and b is
the bias term. SVM separates the data classes by maximizing
the margin defined as minimum distance of any data points to
the decision boundary. If the data are not linearly separable,
optimization problem is defined as below to find the maximal
margin hyperplane;
min
ξ,w,b
1
2‖w‖2 + λ
∑m
p=1 ξp
subject to y(p)(wT x(p) + b) ≥ 1− ξp
and ξp ≥ 0 p = 1, ...,m.
(19)
where m is the number of training samples, x(p), y(p), ξp
are related to pth training sample and y(p) is a class label,
which has one of only two values, either −1 or 1. ξp is a
slack variable. The first term minimizes the distance to the
closest data point, and the second term reduces the number of
misclassified points. Optimization problem is constructed as
the Lagrangian as given below
L(w, b, a) = 12‖w‖2 + λ
∑m
p=1 ξp
−∑mp=1 ap[y(p)(wT x(p) + b)− 1 + ξp]− ∑mp=1 µpξp, (20)
where 0 ≤ ap ≤ λ, λ is a hyperparameter called as penalty
of the error term or regularization term, and µp ≥ 0 is the
Lagrange term. When the above equation is solved, it turns
into following form;
f(x) =
∑m
p=1 apy
(p)K(x(p), x) + b, (21)
where K is a kernel function, and f(x) is called as decision
function or score function which is used to compute score
for each input vector. According to the output of (21), SVM
predicts the class of each input.
2) Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNN): Deep
convolutional neural networks (DCNN) can be thought of as
a series of layers which are trained by the network model
using a given dataset. These layers are convolutional layers,
sub-sampling layers (also known as pooling layers) and full-
connected layers. Pooling and convolution layers are fun-
damental layers of feature extraction part of DCNN. From
the first layer to the last one, simple features are extracted
initially, and gradually it continues to more complex features.
The convolution layer is based on a discrete convolution
process. Discrete convolution in two dimensions is given as
the following;
Y (r, t) =
∞∑
k1=−∞
∞∑
k2=−∞
X(r − k1, t− k2)W (k1, k2), (22)
where Xn1×n2 represents two dimensional input matrix and
Wm1×m2 is a kernel/filter matrix with m1 ≤ n1 and m2 ≤ n2
. A feature map is produced by sliding the convolution filter
over the input signal. The sliding scale is a hyper-parameter
known as stride. When zero padding is not used, calculation
of feature map size or convolution layer output length for each
dimensions can be realized using the following equation
od =
nd − md
sd
+ 1 d = 1, 2. (23)
nd and md represent the length of the input vector and the
kernel length in dth dimension, where s is the value of stride.
Pooling operations decrease the size of feature maps with
some functions taking average or maximum value of each
distinct region of size a1 × a2 from the input. Pooling layer
solves disadvantages related to probability of over-fitting and
computational complexity [50]. Here, pooling layer does not
include learnable parameters like bias units or weights. After
the feature extraction, classification part follows and consists
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Figure 5: Spectrogram, CWT and Gabor wavelet transform applied images. (from left to right no-jamming, BJ, SSJ and RSJ;
from up to down spectrogram, CWT, Gabor wavelet transform)
of one or more full connected layers. In full connected layers,
each neuron is connected to the preceding layer, and at the
end of the classification neural network produces the outputs.
In neural networks, activation function is used for producing
a non-linear decision boundary via functions of the weighted
inputs. As often preferred, in this work rectified linear unit
activation (ReLu) is selected and it is defined as follows:
φ(z) = max(0, z). (24)
In output layers especially related to the classification problem,
softmax function is a very strong option. As a normalized
function, the softmax function is useful to obtain meaningful
class membership predictions in multiclass settings [50]. The
softmax function is defined below, where z is a vector of the
inputs, i is the output index, and M is the number of classes.
p(y = i|z) = φ(z) = e
zi∑M
n=1 e
zn
. (25)
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
LTE signal generation and transmission scheme is modeled
with the MATLAB LTE Toolbox. It offers a realistic modeling
and testing framework for LTE networks. The parameters
regarding to complete system can be found in Table II. The
channels between radio nodes are assumed as flat fading with
unit gain Rayleigh distribution.
Four different jamming scenarios are considered, and the
classification labels are: the absence of a jammer (no jam-
ming), BJ, SSJ, and RSJ. The jamming is assumed to be active
throughout a packet transmission duration. The transmission
is repeated 5000 times for each scenario. In each scenario, the
received signal r is generated in accordance with (6).
Same process is repeated considering four different com-
binations of the jammer and the MN locations. The location
cases and their equivalent SNR/SJR values with error vector
magnitude (EVM) values are given in Table III. As indicated
in [51], EVM is an error metric that strongly depends on
the signal-to-noise/interference ratio (SINR). C1 corresponds
to the case when the jamming signal does not significantly
reduce the transmission. On other cases, EVM values are
higher than 70%, indicating that the transmission is blocked
by the jamming signal. The transmitted signal is assumed to
have unit power. SNR/SJR values are obtained by changing
the variance of the noise signal and jamming power. For all
location cases, radio nodes are assumed to be stationary.
At the second step of the analysis, three different TFT’s are
applied on the received signals in order to compare their per-
formances with classifiers. Figure 5 shows the images obtained
from the Ps, Pcw and Pg on logarithmic scale. These images
are saved in portable network graphics (png) format and fed
into two classifiers. All images for a given transformation are
cropped to the same size in order to eliminate misleading
features.
As it can be seen from Figure 5, the existence of BJ
is observable for every pre-processing method. Considering
spectrogram, differences among no-jamming, SSJ and RSJ
are not apparent due to the single resolution property as
discussed in Section III. Since most of the energy is located
near the low frequencies, the abrupt changes occuring in high
frequencies are not observable from the generated images. For
CWT, the difference between no-jamming and BJ are not as
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Table II: Parameters for numerical analysis.
Step Parameter Value
# of subcarriers 140
# of subframes 10
Duplex Mode FDD
Cyclic Prefix Normal
Modulation Type QPSK
d1 1, 1.5
d2 1, 1.5
SNR (dB) 0, 5
SJNR (dB) -5, 0, -5
Channel Fading Rayleigh
Channel Gain 1
Sampling Frequency 1.92 MHz
PL 4
n1 128
Signal
Transmission
n2 128
σcw 100
γ 5/2
√
2log2
F 256
δts , δtcw 0.1024
δtgm 3.221/f
L 512
Time-Frequency
Transforms
Colormap Jet
PCA component number 1000
C 1
Kernel function linear
Gamma value 0.001
PCA-SVM
Classification
Batch size 64
Epoch number 40
Convolution
layer stride (1,1)
Stochastic
Optimizer Gradient Descent
Learning rate 0.1
Categorical cross
Loss Function entropy function
Total parameters 13,867,988
Trainable parameters 13,866,508
DCNN
Classification
Non-trainable params 1,480
Table III: Description of location cases and their distances,
SNR, SJR and SJNR equivalents
d1 d2 SNR SJR
EVM (%)
No BJ RSJ SSJ
C1 0.5 1.5 10 10 16.58 18.25 17.69 17.14
C2 1 1 5 0 23.14 95.82 85.18 77.64
C3 1 1.5 5 5 23.14 86.15 69.22 71.92
C4 1.5 1 0 -5 30.58 99.72 92.19 79.14
C5 1.5 1.5 0 0 30.58 89.18 83.26 75.84
C6 1.5 0.5 0 -10 30.58 99.16 96.24 98.47
apparent as spectrogram and Gabor wavelet transform, because
of the obscure background. As discussed above, the ambiguity
arises from the cross-term effects is still observable, despite
the cross-term minimizing effects of CWT. Yet, classification
results in the following of this paper show that the features in
the images are still separable by the classifiers.
In Gabor wavelet transform the images of four different
jamming scenarios are separable from each other. For the
no-jamming scenario, energy is mostly localized in the low-
frequency values. As it can be seen from the turquoise colored
region, received signal contains abrupt changes due to the
channel fading and the noise. These changes are closely
located energy content on the time-frequency domain. Hence,
these changes are represented with the same color. In BJ
scenario, jammer attacks are spread over the entire time-
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Figure 6: Different time-frequency analysis comparison for
SVM classification.
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Figure 7: Different time-frequency analysis comparison for
DCNN classification.
frequency plane. As the power of the jammer increases,
the abrupt changes on the signal become dominant over the
time-frequency plane. In SSJ and RSJ, the attacked locations
on time-frequency plane become apparent due to the multi-
resolution property of wavelet transform. The emitted energy
from SSJ and RSJ becomes apparent in Gabor wavelet trans-
form since the wavelets are localized on time-frequency plane.
In classification part, we compare two machine learning
algorithms; DCNN and SVM. DCNN architecture is imple-
mented in KERAS Python library interface that works with
Tensorflow back end, while SVM is implemented in Phyton.
We train each model with 1000 images and the size of images
are 128×128. On parameter selection, we utilize the accuracy
of classification as the main metric. As shown in Figure 4,
DCNN architecture consists of three convolution layers, two
pooling layers and three full-connected layers. We choose 2×2
for pooling size and 3×3 filter size for convolutional kernels.
After each layer we apply batch normalization and ReLu
function, except the output layer in which softmax function
has been used. Also we employ dropout layer of 40% rate to
prevent over-fitting. On the training of the model we use cross
entropy J(Θ) as a cost function [52]:
J(Θ) =
−1
m
m∑
p=1
M∑
n=1
y(p)n log(q
(p)
n ). (26)
where M is the number of classes and m is number of
instances. q(p)n is the estimated probability that the instance
x(p) belongs to class k. y(p)n is equal to 1 if the target class
for the pth instance is k. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. In the
next step, we compute the gradient vector for every class and
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Figure 8: Confusion matrices when Gabor wavelet transform is applied before DCNN classifier for respectively (a) C1, (b)
C2, (c) C3, (d) C4, (e) C5 and (f) C6
use stochastic gradient descent optimizer to find the param-
eter matrix Θ which minimizes the cost function. Besides
DCNN, we also applied SVM to compare their classification
accuracies. Unlike DCNN, SVM requires an explicit feature
extraction step to realize classification. Principal component
analysis (PCA) is used as an effective and robust method
for feature extraction [53]. The central idea of PCA is to
reduce the dimensionality of the data set in which there are
a large number of interrelated variables, while retaining as
much as possible of the variation present in the data set [54].
After feature extraction through PCA, the dimension of the
input vector x fed to the classifier is equal to the number
of extracted principle components. SVM is applied to the
multi-class classification problem by using the "one against
the rest" approach [53]. The fundamental idea underlying this
approach is to realize the multi-class classification by using
multiple binary SVMs collectively. After completion of the
classification model training, 18400 test images are used to
determine the performance of the algorithms for identifying
the jammer types considering a single position case. For every
position case, same training and test process is repeated.
Classification accuracy results obtained by SVM and DCNN
for different simulation setups can be seen from Figure 6 and
Figure 7.
Figure 6 shows the classification accuracies when SVM
is selected as the classifier. The groups at horizontal axis
show the case numbers, where their SNR/SJR equivalents can
be found from Table III. Considering C1, the identification
accuracies are lower than other cases. In this case, jamming
signal is not detected by the identification system. However
note that, the jamming signal cannot block the transmission
anyways, which makes identification obsolete at the first place
as the identification accuracies are lower than other cases.
Considering other cases, the figure shows that the Gabor
wavelet transform outperforms other classification methods
with a minimum of 90% accuracy. As the signal and the
jamming powers become closer to each other, in other words
as the SJR approaches to zero, the classification accuracy of
the Gabor wavelet transform increases. In high SNR values,
classification accuracy is higher than the low SNR values
considering Gabor wavelet transform. Considering C6, the
power of the jamming signal is much more powerful than the
message signal. In this case, jammer signal becomes dominant
over the time-frequency plane, where identification accuracy
improves for all pre-processing methods.
Interestingly, other transform methods do not follow the
same accuracy behavior as the Gabor wavelet transform. Both
Choi-Williams transform and spectrogram work better in the
low SNR region. Especially Choi-Williams works best when
SJR is low. This is plausible because when the power of the
jamming signal is higher than the message signal, the jamming
patterns become more apparent.
Figure 7 shows the classification accuracies when DCNN
is selected as the classifier. Similar to the results of SVM
classifier, the jammer activity cannot detected by the DCNN
classifier in C1. In other cases, all transformation methods
perform better than the SVM classifier in this case. Gabor
wavelet transform gives the best accuracy results overall with
a minimum 93% accuracy. Similar to the SVM classification,
Gabor wavelet works better as the SJR approaches zero.
Although the remaining transformation techniques show high
performance for C2 and C4, their performance are steadily
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reduced in C3 and C5.
If we evaluate the overall success of the classification meth-
ods, the first noticeable feature is the superior jammer classi-
fication performance of the DCNN for all different transforms
and setups. Although SVM has respectable performance in
certain cases, DCNN with its hidden layers provides consistent
and robust performance for all differing setup choices and TFT
methods.
Considering the results in Figure 6 and 7 together, best
working identification method would be the combination of
Gabor wavelet transform and DCNN classifier. As expected
from the previous sections, Gabor wavelet transform gives the
best representation among other transformation methods be-
cause the wavelet characteristics alter the time-frequency plane
resolution and highlight abruptions resulting from jamming.
Figure 8 shows the confusion matrices of Gabor wavelet
transform when used with the DCNN classifier. These con-
fusion matrices describe the performance of the classification
model by demonstrating the comparison of model prediction
and true class for the test dataset. It is a quality measure for
the class by class identification performance of the proposed
method. In C1, DCNN can not accurately differentiate between
the classes, because the very low powered jamming signal
can not get detected on the time-frequency plane. In C2, the
most commonly confused classes are RSJ and no-jammer. One
important observation from all of the cases is that there is
almost no confusion between the different jammer types.
VI. OPEN ISSUES
While the proposed system model determines the jammer
type and its existence, the anti-jamming strategies can be pro-
posed considering the identification model. Especially, legiti-
mate nodes can obtain an advantage through game theoretical
models.
This system model can also be applied for the timing
behaviors of the jammers. In this case, attacks can be identified
at MAC layer. As these jamming attacks strictly rely on the
time characteristics of the channel, the correlation of consec-
utive channel taps should be considered for the identification
performance. Especially for the hybrid jammer identification,
correlated channel models would be a better representation for
modeling the real-time attacks.
The proposed identification system can also be extended to
multi-antenna systems. The monitoring node can benefit from
the diversity came within the multiple antenna structure. The
observations from multiple antennas can be fused with differ-
ent signal processing techniques for jammer identification and
localization.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a novel jammer identification
system and determine the identification performance over
various jamming attack cases. The proposed system can differ-
entiate three main types of jamming attacks: barrage jamming,
synchronization signal jamming and reference signal jamming
cases along with the absence of jammer case. Even though bar-
rage jammer can be easily detected as an unexpected random
noise combined with the original signal, other types of attacks
are harder to detect and to tolerate since they effectively hide
in the targeting time-frequency plane and possibly disrupt
communication with a low power. The proposed system model
is composed of a wavelet-based pre-processing step and a
deep learning based classification stage. We consider an LTE
downlink communication scenario, where the effectiveness of
the wavelet transform based approach is clearly observed,
even in the presence of smart jamming attacks. Considering
different pre-processing methods, the superior performance of
DCNN is observed in comparison to SVM.
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